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"WE WILL TALK OF NOTHING ELSE"
DAKOTA INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TREATY OF 1837

LINDA M. CLEMMONS

D u r i n g treaty negotiations with federal Indian
agents in 1851, Taoyateduta (Little Crow), a
Dakota representative, warned that the council members would "talk of nothing else" until
conflicts related to the previous Treaty of 1837
had been resolved. His statement is surprising,
given that government officials at the time, as
well as subsequent historians, have interpreted
the Treaty of 1837 as a n uncontroversial, even
positive, event for both the Dakota and the
federal government. However, Taoyateduta and
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the other Dakota did not view the Treaty of
1837 in the same way. Instead, Taoyateduta's
words illustrate the continued Dakota disillusionment and anger with the document, close
to fifteen years after the Treaty of 1837 went
into effect.
Nearly thirty years ago, anthropologist Raymond D. Fogelson called for ethnohistorians
to study Native interpretations of historic.al
events.' As Taoyateduta's reaction to the Treaty
of 1837 illustrates, this admonition applies
equally to the present day. Although in recent
years ethnohistorians have integrated Native
viewpoints into their work, many authors still
take the assumptions of white government officials as their starting point.2 T h e Treaty of 1837,
negotiated between the Mdewakanton band of
Dakota (one of the four eastern bands of the
Minnesota Dakota) and t h e federal government, serves as a n excellent case study in how
Native recollections of events and the historical record clash.3 Indian agents at the time, as
well as subsequent historians, have ignored
t h e significance of t h e Treaty of 1837. T h e
Dakota, however, attributed great importance
to the document, and consequences from the
events of 1837 influenced their relations with
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FIG. 1. Drawtng of "Little Crow" (Taoyateduta)
by Frank B. Mayer. (Ayer Art Mayer Sketchbooks)
Courtesy Edward E. Ayer Collection, The Newberry
Llhrary, Chlcago.
government officials and Protestant missionaries for decades to come. Indeed, the Treaty of
1837 served as t h e turning point i n government-Dakota relations, instead of the Treaty
of 1851, which usually is assigned this role
by historians. T h e example of the Treaty of
1837 illustrates that Native perspectives must
be incorporated into the historical narrative
before a more nuanced and complete story of
Indian-white relations i n the antebellum era
can emerge.

A t first glance, there seems to be little controversy over the Treaty of 1837. I n fact, the
sequence of events leading up to t h e negotiation and signing of t h e document is fairly
straightforward, especially when compared with
other antebellum treaties. T h e Mdewakanton
Dakota, like the Cherokee or Choctaw, signed
treaties as part of Andrew Jackson's policy
of Indian removal. According to this plan of

removal, whlch began In the early 1830s, the
federal government hoped to relocate all tribes
living east of the Misslsslppi Rlver to areas west
of the river. These newly vacated lands would
then be opened for extracting resources (such
as gold or timber), settlement, and c u l t i v a t ~ o n . ~
T h e Mdewakanton Dakota, as the only Dakota
band with villages o n the eastern side of the
Mississlppl River, fell under the guidelines of
this aggressive policy of removal. Indeed, as
historian Gary Clayton Anderson argues, relocatlng t h e Mdewakanton Dakota across t h e
Mlssissippl River would allow Andrew Jackson
to nearly realize his ultimate goal of clearing
the eastern lands for settlement and resource
de~elopment.~
Wlth regard to the removal of the Mdewakanton Dakota and other tribes, however, Andrew
Jackson and federal Indian officials not only
justified the land cesslons In terms of the benefits that would accrue to settlers, land agents,
and other investors, but they also insisted that
the new federal Indian policy would help the
Indians. According to thls reasoning, Indians
needed to become civilized, which involved,
among other things, settling o n permanent,
single-family farms, learning to speak, read,
and wrlte English, following certaln gender
roles, a n d converting to Chrlstlanlty. These
things could not happen, the argument ran,
because unscrupulous whltes Influenced t h e
Indlans m negatlve ways.
For example, fur traders encouraged Indlans
to roam over large areas of land searching for
animals, at the expense of learnlng about the
benefits of cultivating small farms and living
In permanent log cablns. Government officlals also worried about the amount of alcohol
sold to the Indians by whlte traders. Agents
argued that ~f the Indians were removed and
placed on smaller tracts of land, they would be
separated from amoral fur and liquor traders
who did not have the Indlans' best interests at
heart. Government officials could then watch
over the Indlans untll they became sophisticated enough to separate themselves from the
unscrupulous elements of whlte soclety. O n
the reservations the Indlans could also attend
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school, receive intensive training in farming,
and learn about Christianity. To summarize,
the reservations were seen as arenas for social
change where Indians could learn to become
civilized Christians.
Federal Indian officials used all aspects of
this preexisting rhetoric to justify opening negotiations with the Mdewakanton Dakota in 1837.
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs at the
time, Carey A. Harris, stated that it would be
"better for both the Indians and the citizens
of this Territory" if the Mdewakanton gave
up their claims to their lands located east of
the Mississippi River. First, the Commissioner
argued that the land was of no use to the Dakota
because it "was barren of game, and unfit for
cultivation." Thus, the Dakota would be much
better off accepting Payments and goods for the
land, which would keep them from starvation.
Second, the Commissioner stated that a treaty
would save them from unscrupulous lumber
companies. According to Harris, lumber companies gave the Mdewakanton "very inadequate considerations" for their timber. This
occurred because the Indians did not have
"the intervention or supervision of any agent
of the Government." The solution to the problem seemed obvious to Harris: the government
needed "to ~urchasethe whole pine country at
once, and to give them a liberal compensation,
to be applied for their benefit, under the direction of the Pre~ident."~
Finally, as an added benefit, Commissioner
Harris argued that a treaty would aid the Indians
by paying their "debts and claims" to traders,
and by providing funds for "the education of the
young, the supply of agricultural implements
and assistance, [and] the employment of interpreters, farmers, mechanics, and laborers" who
would teach them civilized ways7 Clearly, the
treaty would serve a civilizing purpose, whereby
the government would promote agriculture and
education among the Dakota.
Despite the fact that the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs couched the treaty in terms of
its numerous benefits to the Mdewakanton,
various interest groups also influenced the government's decision to press for a land cession in

FIG. 2. Drawing of Dr. Thomas Williamson by
~~~~k B. M
~ ( ~A ~~ M~~~~
~ ~ ~ sketchbooks)
.
Courtesy Edward E. Ayer Collection, The Newberry
Library, Chicago.

1837. Perhaps the most influential lobbyist was
the lumber industry. Loggers clamored for unrestricted access to the pine forests of not only
the Dakota but also of the Ojibwe to the north.
Moreover, traders supported a treaty because
they wanted funds from the land sale to be used
to pay the Dakotas' debts for trade goods.
In theory, Protestant missionaries affiliated
with the American Board of Commissioners
for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) also supported
a treaty. In 1835 the ABCFM, one of the largest and most influential missionary organizations of the antebellum era, opened mission
. ~ organization sent
stations in M i n n e s ~ t aThe
Jedediah Stevens, Thomas Williamson, and
their families to minister to the "savage" and
"untamed" Dakota. Once they arrived in Minnesota, Stevens and Williamson, aided by two
independent missionary brothers, Gideon and
Samuel Pond, immediately established stations
near Fort Snelling (located in present-day St.
Paul) and at Lac qui Parle (approximately a
hundred miles to the west). These stations, however, were expensive to construct and maintain,
especially during times of financial uncertainty
brought about by the Panic of 1837. Thus,
the ABCFM missionaries hoped that treaty
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money would be given to their organization to
help defray the cost of constructing and running their mission stations. Moreover, the missionaries believed that a land cession would
concentrate the Mdewakanton in one place,
which would provide them with greater access
to potential converts.
Finally, in addition to the Protestant missionaries, some mCtis Dakota pressed for a
treaty. In the previous Treaty of 1830, negotiated between the Dakota, several other tribes,
and the federal government, t h e mCtis h a d
been given a tract of land lying by Lake Pepin
for their use. Drawing o n their previous experience, some metis saw a new treaty as a n opportunity to once again benefit materially, either
through a further land cession or through direct
cash payment^.^
In the summer of 1837 pressure from these
diverse groups combined to convince government officials to open treaty negotiations with
the Mdewakanton. At this time, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs Harris instructed the Dakota
agent, Lawrence Taliaferro, to choose a group
of Mdewakanton representatives to travel to
Washington, DC, to meet with Indian officials.'' Taliaferro carried out his orders and
left t h e agency o n August 18 with a group
of twenty-six Dakota. According to historian
Roy W. Meyer, however, this delegation was
not informed in advance that they would be
discussing a land cession once they arrived in
Washington. Instead, the group believed that
the purpose of the trip was to negotiate a peace
settlement with the Sac and Fox, with whom
conflicts had arisen over the past few months."
Once they arrived in Washington, the Dakota
delegation met with Commissioner Harris and
Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett. Lawrence
Taliaferro also sat in on the negotiations. During
the first meeting, which took place on September
21, the group learned the true purpose of the
negotiations; they had not been summoned primarily to settle differences with the Sac and
Fox, but to sell part of their lands to the federal government. Indeed, representatives of the
Sac and Fox peoples had not even arrived in
Washington yet. Standing Cloud, one of the

delegates, expressed his dismay over this change
in focus. He told the negotiators that "we never
dreamed of selling our lands until your agent. . .
invited us to come and visit our Great Father."12
Despite t h e misunderstanding, Poinsett a n d
Harris pressed ahead and lost n o time in making
a n offer for the lands. They demanded that the
Mdewakanton cede all their lands lying east of
the Mississippi River for $1 million.
T h e Dakota delegates did not accept the
government's initial offer, and countered with
the sum of $1.6 million for the same land cession. Secretary Poinsett, however, refused to
even consider their counteroffer, and remained
firmly committed to his initial sum. T h e reluctance of the government to negotiate prompted
Good Road, another delegate, to comment that
~
their
the whites must "love m ~ n e y . " 'Despite
dissatisfaction with the proposal, once the delegates realized that the terms of the treaty were
non-negotiable, they accepted t h e Secretary
of War's initial offer. O n September 29, 1837,
they signed the document agreeing to the sale
of approximately 5 million acres, encompassing
"all their land, east of the Mississippi river, and
all their islands in the said river."14
I n return, t h e Mdewakanton received $1
million. Like all treaties of the era, however,
the Dakota would not get this payment in one
lump sum or in yearly cash payments equal
to t h e total amount. Instead, t h e payments
would be divided i n various ways. T h e first
clause of the treaty (which would later turn
out to be the most confusing and controversial
part of t h e document) stated t h a t t h e government would invest $300,000 and pay t h e
Mdewakanton "annually, forever, a n income
of not less than five percent . . . a portion of
said interest, not exceeding one third, to be
applied in such manner as the President may
direct." The treaty also promised to pay the metis
("not having less t h a n one quarter of Sioux
blood") $110,000 and the traders $90,000 to
cover Mdewakanton debts. T h e Mdewakanton
themselves would receive a yearly payment of
goods for twenty years worth approximately
$15,500.'~Thus, although the Mdewakanton
obtained some money and goods from their
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land cession, the interests that had originally
pushed for the treaty, including the mktis and
traders, benefited from the final document.
T h e Treaty of 1837 also included clauses
designed to promote t h e government's civilization agenda among the Mdewakanton Dakota.
Part of t h e land cession money would be
used to purchase agricultural tools and to hire
farmers, blacksmiths, and eventually, teachers. Specifically, $8,250 would be expended
annually to purchase "medicines, agricultural
implements and stock, and for t h e support of a
physician, farmers, and blacksmiths." Moreover,
the Mdewakanton would receive a one-time
payment of $10,000 in agricultural tools and
other implements to enable them to immediately begin "break[ing] up and improv[ing]
their lands."16 Although a majority i n t h e
U.S. Senate supported the Treaty of 1837 and
the government's civilization agenda, the document's ratification stalled in Congress due to
the nation's precarious financial situation at
the time. Finally, however, the Senate approved
t h e treaty o n June 15, 1838, approximately
nine months after its initial acceptance.
INTERPRETING THE TREATY OF 1837

Ever since t h e Treaty of 1837's ratification, government officials and other interest
groups at t h e time, subsequent historians, and
Dakota affected by t h e treaty have offered
radically different interpretations of the document. These divergent responses ranged from
those who stressed the unqualified success of
the treaty (government officials and some historians), to those who denounced t h e treaty
as a crime against all Dakota (originally t h e
Mdewakanton, and later the three other Eastern Dakota bands who joined in these vocal
protests). T h e ABCFM missionaries of t h e
time occupied a middle position between these
two extremes, supporting t h e document i n
theory but finding fault with the way the government carried out some of its provisions.
From 1837 on, sources existed to document all
these interpretations, but the historical record
has largely ignored that of the Dakota (and

to a lesser extent, the ABCFM missionaries).
In order to fully assess the Treaty of 1837, all
interpretations must be considered.
Immediately after the treaty's ratification,
antebellum government officials, including the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, touted the document as a positive achievement for the United
States. After its ratification, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs Harris, in his December 1,
1837, report, called the Treaty of 1837 a success because it secured "permanent boundaries" and a "more regular form" for the union.17
Although the ceded Mdewakanton lands were
a very small fraction of t h e Dakota's total
holdings in Minnesota, and the document was
signed by only one out of t h e four bands of
Eastern Dakota, the Treaty firmly established
a precedent for opening t h e area to settlement. Indeed, prior to the treaty, as historian
William Watts Folwell points out, n o lands in
the Minnesota area had been open to settlement; all was Indian
T h e Treaty of
1837 changed this forever. Thus, even though
t h e Treaty of 1837 did not receive as much
press as other Indian removal treaties of the
era, such as the Treaty of New Echota with
the Cherokees, government officials believed
that the Treaty of 1837 with the Mdewakanton
would help to bring Andrew Jackson's policy of
Indian removal one step closer to completion.
Government officials also lauded the Treaty of
1837 for its focus on civilizing the Mdewakanton.
T h e money from the land sale bound the United
States "to supply the Sioux, as soon as practicable," with medicines, agricultural implements,
and stock, and to hire physicians, farmers, and
blacksmith^.'^ T h e government farmers, along
with t h e agricultural implements, would be
utilized to convert the Mdewakanton men from
hunters into settled farmers. According to t h e
parlance of the day, teaching the Dakota men
to farm would lead them to self-sufficiency and
away from lives of starvation and privation
which supposedly corresponded with a hunting e x i ~ t e n c e . ~T' h e treaty would also provide
teachers to instruct t h e next generation of
Dakota in reading and writing in English and
American civilization i n general. Eventually,

err it or^."
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government officials claimed, these teachers would turn t h e children into productive
American citizens.
Agent Lawrence Taliaferro, who was charged
with carrying out the Treaty of 1837 o n the
local level, did n o t h i n g to dispel t h e federal government's positive interpretation of
t h e document. I n his annual reports to t h e
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Taliaferro
continually stressed t h e ease with which the
Mdewakanton accepted the terms of the treaty.
Taliaferro confirmed t h a t t h e clause of t h e
treaty requiring the Mdewakanton to vacate
ceded lands and relocate o n the west side of the
Mississippi River had been executed without
incident or complaint. "After disposing of all
their lands east of the Mississippi by the treaty
of 1837, these people [the Mdewakanton] have
been prevailed upon (such as had been residing
east) to remove west," he wrote. This had been
"arranged permanently," h e continued, "without expense or trouble [emphasis mine], and
they now rest upon their remaining soil west"
of the Mississippi ~ i v e r . ~ l
Taliaferro also informed officials in Washington that the Mdewakanton did not have any
complaints about t h e distribution of monies
and goods promised in t h e treaty. "The payment of the annuity to the Sioux Indians was
made to the heads of families, and as far as I
have been informed, was entirely satisfactory to
the nation," h e stated. "All of the bands of this
tribe have, under the liberal provisions incorporated in their treaty, been supplied amply
with agricultural implements; well-qualified
farmers have been assigned to each town, and
two blacksmith shops put in blast at points
suited to the views and wishes of the ~ n d i a n s . " ~ ~
Thus, federal officials in Washington, bolstered
by Taliaferro's reports, called the Treaty of 1837
a complete success.
Although Lawrence Taliaferro and government officials in Washington penned glowing
reports of t h e Treaty of 1837 and its implementation, ABCFM missionaries who lived
closest to t h e Mdewakanton Dakota became
increasingly conflicted over the relative merits
of the document. As already mentioned, the

ABCFM missionaries at first supported t h e
treaty. Like the federal agents, the missionaries
shared the desire to civilize and Christianize
the Dakota and wanted to obtain government
funds to achieve these goals. Just as they had
hoped, the missionaries initially benefited from
the Treaty of 1837. For example, ABCFM missionary Gideon Pond was appointed to serve
as t h e government farmer-a
position t h a t
had been created by the Treaty of 1 8 3 7 . ~T~h e
government's payment of Pond's salary freed
up funds for investment i n other missionary
activities. Moreover, in 1838 t h e missionaries
were pleased when Agent Taliaferro asked
Washington to designate $5,000 of t h e treaty
funds for t h e ABCFM schools.24 Again i n
1839 the agent requested that t h e federal government give $500 to t h e ABCFM school at
Lake ~ a r r i e t . ~ ~
Despite the fact that the missionaries happily accepted salaries and school subsidies from
the treaty, they did not support all aspects of
the document. At the same time Samuel Pond
supported his brother's appointment as government farmer, he also criticized the Treaty of 1837
for providing annuities to the Mdewakanton.
Pond wanted to teach t h e Mdewakanton to
become self-sufficient small farmers, and h e
strongly believed that any handout of goods
from the government would delay this process.
Pond's comments about the subsequent Treaty
of 1841 (which was negotiated and signed but
never ratified) equally describes his reservations
about the earlier treaty. Because t h e Dakota
would not have to work for the annuities, Pond
believed that these handouts would "render
them indolent and dissipated." Annuities would
allow them to "live without care, and waste
their time in idleness and dissipation."26
In addition to criticizing a central aspect of
the Treaty of 1837, the missionaries disagreed
with Taliaferro's appraisal of the Mdewakant o n satisfaction with t h e document a n d its
implementation. Taliaferro reported t h a t t h e
Mdewakanton were happy with t h e treaty
and that its terms had been carried out to the
satisfaction of all. T h e missionaries, however,
informed their home board in Boston that this
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was far from the truth. First, the Dakota had
been very upset over the delay in the treaty's
ratification. Stephen Riggs, who had arrived in
Minnesota in 1837 to minister to the Dakota,
reported that "[o]wing to the delay in the ratification of the treaty last fall the Sioux here are,
at present, in a very disturbed state. They can't
conceive why the terms of the treaty should
not be fulfilled."27 Worse yet, once the treaty
had been ratified, the promised payments and
goods did not arrive on time, despite Taliaferro's
assurances to the contrary in his reports. All
these delays and broken promises caused Riggs
to worry that the Dakota would lose all "confidence in our go~ernment."~'
If the Dakota lost faith i n the government,
the missionaries realized that they would be
t h e first to suffer t h e consequences. I n t h e
1830s t h e Dakota (with reason) treated t h e
missionaries as a n extension of the federal government. Thus, if problems arose over government policy, the missionaries, as t h e closest
government representatives, received the brunt
of Dakota anger. Jedediah Stevens, who worked
at the ABCFM mission, described this problem. "The Indians about us for several months
past have manifested much dissatisfaction
and restlessness, occasioned principally by a
delay in carrying into effect the Treaty made
with them last fall," h e informed the ABCFM
Secretary in Boston. As a result, the Dakota
killed four of Stevens's mission cattle, which he
estimated to be worth $ 1 0 0 . ~ ~
W h e n analyzing t h e Treaty of 1837, most
historians have downplayed or ignored missionary reports like Stevens's. Instead, they
have treated the events of 1837 as relatively
unimportant to the larger history of Dakotagovernment interaction. Two main reasons justify this lack of interest in the Treaty of 1837.
First, historians point out that the treaty was
signed by only one of the four bands of Eastern
Dakota. Moreover, the final land cession was a
relatively small amount of land when compared
with the total holdings of the Dakota at the
time. As Minnesota historian William Folwell
stated, the "little delta of territory between the
Mississippi River and the St. Croix acquired by

the treaty of 1837 was a trifling fraction of the
immense domain embraced within the boundaries of Minnesota by her organic act."30
Second, the Treaty of 1837 was eclipsed by
t h e subsequent Treaty of 1851, whereby t h e
four bands of Dakota signed away all their
lands in Minnesota in return for a reservation.
Historian Bruce David Forbes argued that the
turning point in Dakota-government relations
"was 1851, when the Dakota signed two treaties
that ceded almost all of southern and western
Minnesota to the United state^."^^ Although
historian Roy Meyer mentions that the Treaty
of 1837 caused some hard feelings among the
Dakota, especially when the government failed
to deliver the promised annuities and payments
on time, he ultimately agreed with Forbes that
"the small cession made in . . . 1837 involv[ed]
lands n o longer extensively used by them,"
and was ultimately eclipsed by the subsequent
Treaty of 1851.32
While most historians have downplayed the
significance of the Treaty of 1837, especially in
relation to subsequent treaties, historian Gary
Clayton Anderson, i n his book Kinsmen of
Another Kind and article "The Removal of the
Mdewakanton Dakota i n 1837," extensively
analyzed the document. In both of these works
Anderson provided a well-researched history of
the events of 1837; indeed, he provides needed
context and explanation that other historians
fail to mention in their brief summaries. In his
interpretation of the circumstances leading up
to the treaty, as well as the document itself,
however, t h e author echoed t h e rhetoric of
the government officials at the time. In both
works Anderson stressed the benign nature of
the treaty, as well as its numerous benefits to
the Mdewakanton Dakota. Indeed, Anderson
interprets t h e Treaty of 1837 as a n example
of the positive results that could arise from
Jackson's policy of Indian removal.33
Anderson argued that Jacksonian Indian
policy, at least with regard to t h e Dakota,
should be viewed as a positive event because
it saved the Mdewakanton. Prior to the treaty,
Anderson stated that Dakota who resided and
hunted o n lands east of the Mississippi were
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starving. "Unfortunately," Anderson wrote, "the
once bountiful herds of deer and buffalo had
disappeared from t h e vicinity by 1837, causing severe food shortage^."^^ Because of declining buffalo, "some kind of governmental action
was necessary to save the Mde~akanton."'~
The
Treaty of 1837 provided annuities, which "did
much to subsidize the meager economy of the
hldewakanton, and they made up for the scarcity of guns and blankets."j6 Anderson called
the annuity system a n "overall success," once
implemented, because it "obviously saved the
In the
Mdewakanton from utter de~truction."~'
end, the Mdewakanton were better off a decade
after the treaty went into force; it kept the tribe
from starvation, provided educational opportunities, and ultimately "brought a certain degree
of stability to the upper Mississippi Valley."38
Dakota at the time, especially the Mdewakanton, would have challenged this interpretation of the Treaty of 1837. First, the Treaty of
1837 was a seminal event for them, and took
on more significance as time went on. Far from
bringing stability to t h e Mississippi Valley,
the document fomented protest, discord, and
anger, among not only the Mdewakanton and
the federal government, but among the three
other bands of Dakota (the Sisseton, Wahpeton,
and Wakpekute) who had not originally been
involved in the treaty negotiations. Indeed, the
Mdewakanton succeeded in establishing a loose
alliance of Dakota villages across Minnesota
united against the Treaty of 1837. Because of
the significance that all four bands of Eastern
Dakota came to attribute to the document, the
Treaty of 1837 can be seen as one of the turning
points in Dakota-white relations.
From the very beginning, many aspects of
the Treaty of 1837 angered the Mdewakanton.
Some Dakota questioned t h e underhanded
method by which the Indian agents had conducted the negotiations; they pointed out that
the delegates had been brought to Washington
under false pretenses. Several Mdewakanton
also were upset about t h e concessions t h a t
had been given to the traders and mCtis, while
others believed the selling price for the land
was much too low.

Once the treaty had been ratified, this initial dissatisfaction only increased. Despite
Taliaferro's assurances to t h e contrary, t h e
promised annuities and payments did not arrive
on time, and the Mdewakanton strongly criticized the government's inability to carry out
their side of the bargain. Jedediah Stevens, the
ABCFM missionary near Fort Snelling, commented that the Mdewakanton were extremely
upset that parts of the Treaty of 1837 had not
been carried into effect. "They manifest considerable dissatisfaction toward the Govt. Agent
[emphasis his], Traders and whites generally," he
explained, "and at present seem to occupy rather
a threatening position."39
Although delayed, the majority of the promised annuities and payments eventually arrived
and were distributed to Mdewakanton families. T h e government, however, failed to follow
through with one clause of the Treaty of 1837
for t h e next fifteen years. While seemingly
minor, this provision took o n extraordinary
significance and led to a significant break i n
relations between t h e federal government,
ABCFM missionaries living near their villages,
and all four bands of Dakota. These problems
continued from the early 1840s into the 1850s.
T h e disputed treaty clause stated that the
government would invest $300,000 and pay the
Mdewakanton "annually, forever, a n income of
not less t h a n five percent . . . a portion of said
interest, not exceeding one third, to be applied
in such manner as the President may direct.'"
In one sense, all involved parties agreed o n the
meaning of the treaty clause-the government
was required to spend $5,000 per year for the
benefit of the Mdewakanton people. T h e agreement ended there, however. Government officials argued that during the treaty signing they
had made it clear that the president would use
the entire sum to pay for educational programs;
they certainly never intended for t h e president to give the money to the Mdewakanton
to spend as they pleased. T h e Mdewakanton,
however, had a different understanding of the
article's meaning. They told the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs "that at the time of the treaty
they were assured that t h e money would be
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used for something other t h a n education.'*' As
both sides dug in and refused to compromise,
tensions increased as the government failed to
distribute the funds for several years in a row,
until by 1850 the payments had accumulated to
a n excess of $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . ~ ~
Although the majority of the funds remained
unspent, t h e ABCFM missionaries received
several initial payments of the disputed money
to help r u n their schools. T h i s angered t h e
Mdewakanton, who charged that the government paid t h e Protestants "for teaching t h e
children here out of money due them . . . for
their lands sold to the United States.lq3 Despite
the fact that t h e missionaries promised that
they n o longer used any of the disputed funds
by the early 1840s, Mdewakanton continued
to believe that t h e ABCFM schools were "a
scheme of the missionaries for making money
out of them."44
Because of these controversial school funds,
t h e M d e w a k a n t o n focused m u c h of t h e i r
anger over the Treaty of 1837 o n the ABCFM
missionaries. Several other reasons also led
the Dakota to direct their aggression at t h e
Protestant missionaries instead of the federal
government. First, t h e ABCFM missionaries
were simply a better day-to-day target t h a n
the federal agents, as they lived closest to the
Dakota villages and interacted daily with men,
women, and children as they worked to spread
their message. Second, the missionaries did not
have military support of their own to counter any Dakota challenges to their authority.
Finally, the Mdewakanton could express their
anger over the Treaty of 1837 in a tangible way
by targeting mission schools and churches.
Because of their ease as a target, as well as
their initial receipt of money from the Treaty of
1837, attendance at the ABCFM schools located
near Mdewakanton villages sharply declined
beginning in 1839. Anti-treaty Mdewakanton
used many different methods to keep students
from attending classes. For example, angry
Mdewakanton lined the path to the schools
and attempted to intimidate the students into
returning home. In other cases, parents who
sent students to school were mocked, and in sev-

eral cases even ostracized, by village members.
As a result, attendance dropped precipitously.
Jedediah Stevens reported that his school at
Lake Harriet only had between five and eight
students because of the growing anger over the
Treaty of 1837. He expected things to get worse,
predicting that "portentious [sic] clouds [hung]
over the future" of the ABCFM mission.45
Stevens's prediction proved t o be prescient, as anti-treaty Mdewakanton not only
continued to harass mission schools located
near their own villages throughout the early
1840s, but also worked to spread their discontent to the three other bands of Dakota. A t
first t h e Mdewakanton focused their efforts
on t h e Wahpeton, as the band located closest to them geographically. I n 1842 several
Mdewakanton traveled to the Wahpeton village of Lac qui Parle to inform them about the
conflict with the government and missionaries
over education funds from the Treaty of 1837.
They urged the Wahpeton to join their protest
even though the treaty officially applied only to
the Mdewakanton. In the end, the majority of
Lac qui Parle Wahpeton chose to support the
Mdewakanton in their dispute with the government and missionaries. Stephen Riggs reported
that after meeting with the Mdewakanton, the
Wahpeton immediately "ordered the missionaries to leave." Much to Riggs's chagrin, this
opposition "continued to embarrass our operations till the treaty of Mendota in 1851.'q6
T h e success of the anti-treaty Mdewakanton
in convincing the Lac qui Parle Wahpetons
to join their cause inspired them to spread
their message to other Wahpeton, Sisseton,
and Wahpekute villages located near mission stations. They also worked t o keep t h e
Mdewakanton united. To create and maintain
this loose anti-treaty alliance, Mdewakanton
emissaries traveled to communities near mission stations. A t each of these villages, t h e
emissaries attended a council meeting, presented their case against t h e ABCFM, and
urged the members to unite with them in opposing t h e missionaries, a n d by extension, t h e
Treaty of 1837. For example, in 1843 Thomas
Williamson reported that "Tatepose has sent

182 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, SUMMER 2005

word1' about the missionaries' role in the controversy over the Treaty of 1837 "as far as h e
could and that was his principal business when
he was up [here] and they held those consultations last spring.'*7 Likewise, Daniel Gavin, a
Swiss missionary associated with the Societk
des Missions ~ v a n ~ e l i ~de
u eLausanne,
s
warned
Samuel Pond t h a t "Wakouta has just come
down t h e St. Peter again" to talk to other
Mdewakanton near his mission at Red Wing.
According to Gavin, Wakouta seemed determined "to exert all his efforts to obtain t h e
funds set aside" by the treaty for educational
purposes. Missionaries like Williamson a n d
Ciavin wished that Wakouta and other emissaries would "have been content with doing
mischief in his own band" instead of spreading
discontent to other villages.4'
W h e n the emissaries spoke at councils, they
used many different arguments to convince the
village members to join their cause. Most importantly, they appealed to the cultural and kinship
bonds between villages. I n 1846 Williamson
noted that a visiting Mdewakanton asked the
villagers living near his station to "please their
relatives" by joining in their protest.4' T h e emissaries also told the council members that the
treaty crisis affected all Dakota people because
the ABCFM stole money from the Treaty of 1837
to fund all their mission schools, not only those
located near the Mdewakanton. According to
Thomas Williamson, "[s]ome ill disposed persons" told the Wahpeton that "we were paid
for teaching the Warpetonwan here out of the
money due the Mde~akantonwan."~'Finally,
the emissaries warned council members that the
Treaty of 1837 created a dangerous precedent.
If council members chose not to join the protests, the government could sign similar treaties
that would use Dakota funds to support mission
projects. Because the Mdewakanton emissaries
backed up their criticism with personal experience, they made a n impact o n the councils. T h e
federal government had indeed given some of
the education funds to the ABCFM schools, had
subsequently failed to distribute any funds, and
had ignored the Mdewakanton interpretation of
the education clause.

For these reasons, the Mdewakanton emissaries succeeded in convincing villages located
near mission stations to join with them i n
opposing t h e ABCFM missionaries. Letters
and reports written by t h e missionaries note
the existence of such a loose alliance. I n 1844
Stephen Riggs reported that the Mdewakanton
"have been making efforts to form a league
among themselves against missions and schools.
T h e Warpekute, Warpetonwan and Sisitonwan
bands . . . have been imbibing too much of the
same feeling; and some . . . have become open
opposers. This is peculiarly true at Lac qui Parle."5'
Riggs also noted that in the 1840s, a "strong organized opposition grew up" among the Dakota "on
the Mississippi and lower Minnesota.'"'
Ten years later, t h e government still had
not released the disputed funds. As a result,
the united opposition to the missionaries continued throughout Dakota country. I n 1850
Thomas Williamson summarized the chilling
effect that problems arising from the Treaty of
1837 had o n missionary work, not only among
the Mdewakanton but also at stations located
near Sisseton and Wahpeton villages. As "the
sum [from the education fund] increased," h e
wrote, "so have the difficulties from this source
i n c r e a ~ e d . "These
~~
continuing problems over
the Treaty of 1837 caused all Dakota villages,
regardless of their involvement in t h e original treaty negotiations, to distrust the federal
government, and their proxies, t h e ABCFM
missionaries.

Thus, when Dakota representative Taoyateduta refused to "talk of nothing else" but the
controversy over t h e Treaty of 1837 during
t h e 1851 negotiations for Dakota lands, h e
was referring to a n almost fifteen-year history
of sustained conflict in t h e upper Mississippi
region. Taoyateduta's reference to t h e united
and long-running opposition of t h e Dakota to
the Treaty of 1837 illustrates that government
officials at the time, as well as subsequent historians, have underestimated the significance
of the document. T h e Dakota did not see the
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Treaty of 1837 as a n insignificant or positive
event, nor did they forget t h e document as
they headed into new treaty negotiations with
the government. Indeed, it can be argued that
the Treaty of 1837 served as the turning point
in government-Dakota relations, instead of the
Treaty of 1851, which usually is assigned this
role. By 1851 the Dakota had already learned to
mistrust the government and to question their
ability to follow through with promises made
during treaty negotiations.
As such, a study that includes Dakota reactions to the Treaty of 1837 not only adds another
dimension t o the story of Dakota-white relations in the antebellum period, it significantly
alters t h e historical narrative. Without a n
understanding of the Dakota response to the
Treaty of 1837, Taoyateduta's words during the
1851 negotiations remain elusive. However, his
statement comes sharply into focus once the
Dakota history of strong and sustained protest
to the Treaty of 1837 is brought to light. A t
t h e same time, however, t h e positive interpretations by government agents at the time
a n d by subsequent historians should n o t be
entirely dismissed. Rather, both stories should
be integrated to form a further illustration of
the miscommunications, misinformation, and
conflicting agendas that frequently characterized Indian-government relations both during,
before, and after the antebellum period. Only
in this way c a n t h e volatile and conflicting
relations between Indians and whites begin to
become comprehensible.
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